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THOUGHTS ON KEEPING
MY MOUTH SHUT
David H. Smith
Director, Poynter Center for the Study of
Ethics and American Institutions
Indiana University
This paper is based on a presentation
made to the WMU Center for the Study of
Ethics in Society, April 4, 1986
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Some time ago, I found myself in a meeting with
a colleague who was planning a faculty seminar on
moral issues related to war. He asked my advice about
including another faculty member better known to me
than to him. The subject of discussion is learned, well
intentioned, desperately in need of support. He is also
intemperate, self-righteous and relentless in pursuit of
the social causes to which he is committed. He can be
impossible to work with. What should I say?
Earlier, another colleague had asked me about a
former student. She (the student) had taken a course
with me in the previous year. It proved a difficult
semester for her. She has a ten-year-old child born out
of wedlock. Just before taking my class, she decided
to abort another pregnancy because she and the child's
father were about to marry and were unready to handle
a baby. Then, two weeks after their marriage, her new
husband left her because he had found someone else.
Now my former student was behaving erratically in a
colleague's class. She seemed depressed, moody and
inconsistent in her performance. My colleague asks if
I know anything that might be helpful. Should I tell
him what I know?
Not long after these events the nation read with
mixed feelings the details of President's Reagan's
prostate surgery. Stories clearly explaining everything
that was to be done, with illustrations, were published
on the front pages of newspapers. Parts of the
presidential plumbing were subjected to extensive
public scrutiny. Was this offensive in any serious
sense?
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These short anecdotes suggest some dimensions
of the issue of confidentiality as it comes up for me. I
shall attempt briefly to note several perspectives on the
issue of secrets. To no one's surprise I will not solve
the problems, but with luck I will say enough to
provoke discussion.
The traditional Roman Catholic analysis of
confidentiality is a convenient beginning. It assumed
that knowledge about a person amounted to power
over that person, power that could be used for good or
ill. A general duty to use the power for good
followed, on these terms, from fundamental duties of
beneficence and nonmaleficence. Knowledge can be
used to help people or hurt them, and, like other kinds
of power, this power of speech is subject to ordinary
constraints: It should not be used to hurt, and, all
things being equal, should be used to help.
The Catholic analysis goes on to contrast the
natural obligation to keep secrets with more stringent
responsibilities rooted in commitments. These might
be (a) a commitment after the fact (promised secret);
(b) a commitment that served as the reason that
information was acquired, or as a Q,uidpro Q,uo (a
commtted secret); and (c) an implicit promise that
serves as the Q,uidpro Q,uo(a professional secret). The
general idea is that information I receive as a result of
committing myself to keeping a secret is especially
confidential. It is doubly protected by the natural duty
not to harm another and by the bond of a promise. 1
We can apply this analysis directly to the cases I
described. The conclusion will be: Insofar as I
promised not to tell, I must not. The promise is an
implicit aspect of the medical or priestly role. But what
about other professionals? Lawyers clearly grant
confidence to clients and reporters to their sources, but
do academics with their colleagues or students? And
what of the medical history of someone in public life?
By focusing our attention on the idea of an implicit
promise, the traditional Catholic analysis implies the
centrality of human choice. The strictest bond applies
only when I have chosen to let it.
While I do not deny personal responsibility, I
begin with an assumption that basic obligations can
arise apart from individual choices. The reason is that
the self has some fated engagements. We are not able
to design our lives and loves as an artist might design a
work of art. The paradigmatic person is not unattached
but encumbered.
In other words, I begin with the conviction that
our lives are fundamentally lives of interdependence.
The newborn, the sufferer from Alzheimer's desease,
the adolescent trying to figure out who he is--all these
illustrations of marginally independent forms of
existence are in fact prisms of what is means to be a
self. We are not terribly different from them. We are
not most truly ourselves when we feel "in charge" but
when we acknowledge that our lives are lives of
coping and neediness.
Thus, the core of ourselves is found in our
loyalties, in those bonds that shape us and that give
purpose to our lives. Some of these loyalties are
damning and some may be salvific; I do not wish here
to attempt to sort out all the possible allegiances and
betrayals that can become the substance of a life. All I
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mean to do is insist that we should begin our moral
reflections with the claims of loyalty.
II
We share a past with people who are not always
of our own choosing. They have a history--of loves,
disappointments, successes and failures, projects and
hopes; children, parents and lovers. These loyalties of
theirs have made them who they are as we know them.
They constitute our associates' particularity.
In The Mill on the Floss George Eliot presents an
example of the problems that arise when past
associations are not respected. When they fall in love,
Stephen and Maggie are engaged to others. He is
conventionally engaged, but Maggie, whose life has
been joyless, has drifted into a platonic bond with a
fine but unattractive childhood acquaintance. Stephen
feels that their existing bonds should be broken: "We
should break all these mistaken ties that were made in
blindness and determine to marry each other," he tells
Maggie. "We can't help the pain it will give. It is
come upon us without our seeking; it is natural..."
Stephen argues that fidelity will only make their
betrothed partners unhappy: "[T]here may be misery
in it for them as well as for us." To this Maggie
responds that feeling constantly cuts across
commitments made in the past.
If life were easy and simple, as it might
have been in paradise ...!mean if life did
not make duties for us before love comes
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--[then] love would be a sign that two
people ought to belong to each other. But
I see-- I feel it is not so now: there are
things we must renounce in life: some of
us must resign love. Many things are
difficult and dark to me; but I see one
thing quite clearly--that I must not, cannot
seek my own happiness by sacrificing
others. Love is natural; but surely pity
and faithfulness and memory are natural
too. And they would live in me still and
punish me, if I did not obey them.2
In the event she does run away with Stephen, but she
regrets it. "If the past is not to bind us, where can duty
lie? We should have not law but the inclination of the
moment." Stephen does not accept her analysis, of
course. "You can 't save them from pain now; you can
only tear yourself back from me, and make my life
worthless to me." But this time she holds firm.
Faithfulness and constancy mean
something else besides doing what is
easiest and pleasantest to ourselves.
They mean renouncing whatever is
opposed to the reliance others have in
us--whatever would cause misery to
those whom the course of our lives has
made dependent on us.3
This stress on the importance of past commitments
affects our discussion of speech as well as of love.
What we say can be faithful to those who are a part of
our past, or it can betray them.
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III
If Maggie is right, past involvements limit what
we can say and to whom. We rightly praise persons
with the courage to risk their careers in acts of
"whistleblowing," but our respect is cheap if we do not
see that there is a prima facie obligation to keep the
company's secrets. Peter Drucker argues that focus on
the choice to break confidence is misdirected; the prior
question is creation of a climate of trust between
superior and inferior in the organizational hierarchy. If
these ties of trust and loyalty break down, the weaker
party becomes "powerless against the unscrupulous
superior" who "no longer can recognize or meet his
obligation to the subordinate." A whistleblower is a
confidence breaker, he continues, an "informer" and
"the only societies in Western history that encouraged
informers were bloody and infamous
tyrannies-- Tiberius and Nero in Rome, the Inquisition
in the Spain of Philip II, the French Terror and
Stalin. ,,4
Drucker's general point is that the breaking of
confidence that whistleblowing involves should be the
exception rather than the rule. More than a perception
of injustice, it reveals a fundamental collapse of
community. Persons who are unwilling to limit their
speech in virtue of indebtedness to groups of which
they have been a part cannot really have been members
of a moral community, for community cannot exist
without trust that present engagments will have some
degree of permanence. To be sure, this failure of
community may not have been the whistleblower's
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fault. But its absence is tragic and a most fundamental
corruption.
Past engagements of the self create expectations
and obligations of confidentiality. Thus, talk about my
student or my colleague must be restricted by past
association, even if-- as in these cases-- I did not
choose the involvement. In both cases, I have more
than a general duty: I have a role-related one in virtue
of a common past. In neither case, however, is the
correct moral inference from this fact clear. In order to
advance, we must raise the question of the particular
kind of relationship and expectation that are involved.
Some relationships involve an absolute duty of keeping
confidence--but not all personal involvements carry
the same degree of stringency.
It's probable that I have a stronger duty to keep
secrets about my student than my colleague. I gained
knowledge about her in private, in a context of power
imbalance between us, so her level of trust was high.
Her struggles are not a matter of public record. In
contrast, my colleague's character is public, perhaps
the liabilities more conspicuous than the assets. He
cannot expect anything more from me than candor,
although his interpretation of a common history may
well differ from mine. But I cannot have a duty never
to mention the perceived weaknesses of those I know.
If this casuistry is credible, I should talk about
my colleague, but am stopped from revelations about
my student. This result is troubling, for it appears that
supposedly moral principles are keeping me from
doing an act of kindness. The student is dealing with a
teacher who wants to help her. To resolve problems
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like this, traditional Catholic moralists developed the
category of "mental reservation" or "veiled speech."
The general idea is a studied ambiguity, with the full
content reserved "in the mind" or "veiled."5
This concept has two fundamental assumptions.
First, most speech about social matters carries a
significant breadth of meaning. Communication is
polyvalent. Calling a friend thorou~h is an insult in
some contexts and a compliment in others. What one
singles out to feature in a personal description is a
fateful choice, as all readers (and thoughtful writers) of
letters of recommendation know. "He's tied up" may
mean he is bound to his chair, in a committee meeting,
having a drink or in the bathroom. The metaphorical
quality is inseparable from speech about social matters.
Second, the veiled speech theory assumes that
we should cherish this polyvalence rather than
attempting to exorcise it. Sissela Bok, in Secrets,
takes the contrary view. She discusses the Tarasoff
case and arugues that the majority of the California
court came to the right decision. "No evidence
suggests that therapy will be imperiled if patients know
that therapists have the duty to reveal their plans of
violence." Futhermore, "It is not right...to risk one
person's life in order to help patients and reduce the
violence in society. Tatiana Tarasoff should not have
had to run that risk without having consented
thereto. ,,6 For Bok, the driving force is worry about
abuse of professional power. Ambiguous speech
would contribute to professional mystification and
demagoguery.
I disagree. Ambiguity that confuses is bad;
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ambiguity that lets me suggest the need to help, or
ways of helping, is a blessing. So I might say,
"Helen's been having some tough personal times," or
"She has had a rotten deal and needs help," or "Try to
get her to come in to talk to you." Tatiana Tarasoff
could have been warned and protected with veiled
speech. In artful ways, we can use speech to help
without betraying a confidence. In speech about both
colleague and student, I should "veil" and play the
poet. The veil covering the student's nakedness
should be thicker in the sense of disclosure of the
details, yet more flexible in the urgency of
communication. Silence is a less legitimate option
here than in response to the question about the
colleague; indiscreet detail would be worse.
IV
Some of the hardest issues of confidentiality,
however, come up in less intimate contexts, contests in
which expectations are generated, but in which they
cannot possibly be met literally. Mark Siegler, a
physician writing in the New En~land Journal of
Medicine, holds that confidentiality is a "decrepit
concept." It is, Dr. Siegler states, "old, worn-out and
useless." He cites the case of a patient in a large
teaching hospital. The patient was admitted for an
elective gall bladder removal, and was surprised that a
particular physician had seen his chart. At this point
Siegler did a little checking. He was "amazed" to leam
that
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at least 25 and possibly as many as 100
health professionals and administrative
personnel at our university hospital had
access to the patient's record and that all
of them had a legitimate need, indeed a
professional responsibility, to open and
use that chart. These persons included 6
attending physicians (the primary
physician, the surgeon, the pulmonary
consultant, and others); 12 house
officers (medical, surgical, intensive-care
unit, and "covering" house staff); 20
nursing personnel (on three shifts); 6
respiratory therapists; 3 nutritionists; 2
clinical pharmacists; 15 students (from
medicine, nursing, respiratory therapy,
and clinical pharmacy); 4 unit secretaries;
4 hospital financial officers; and 4 chart
reviewers (utilization review, quality
assurance review., tissue review, and
insurance auditor).
It is of interest, Siegler continues, that this patient's
problem was straightforward, and he therefore did not
require many other technical and support services that
the modem hospital provides. Siegler notes that there
was no need to call in the chaplain, physical therapist,
occupational therapist, or consultant physicians. Even
then, he goes on,
Upon completing my survey I reported to
the patient that I estimated that at least 75
health professionals and hospital
personnel had access to his medical
record. I suggested to the patient that
these people were all involved in
providing or supporting his health-care
services. They were, I assured him,
working for him. Despite my
reassurances the patient was obviously
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distressed and retorted, "I always
believed that medical confidentiality was
part of a doctor's code of ethics. Perhaps
you should tell me just what you people
mean by 'confidentiality!",g
Siegler goes on to argue that the logistics of modem
medicine, expecially in group practice and tertiary care
settings, make confidentiality literally understood not
only impossible but undesirable. Information must be
shared among members of a health care team, if
patients are really to be helped. The real problem, he
contends, is "indiscretion," i.e., blabbing about
patients outside the health care setting.
I concede Siegler's general point that in a context
like his the duty of keeping confidence must attach to
the medical team. But is this obligation a substitute for
individual duties? The limitation of Siegler's argument
is that he is so preoccupied with professional necessity
that he loses sight of the legitimate bite of the patient's
expectations. The patient entrusts himself to someone,
telling the physician of his marital problems or the
nurse of his career failure. Should the health care team
pool all this information on the chart or in staff
conferences? Well-intentioned as that might be (in the
best case), it would amount to a betrayal of the
patient's trust, for he naturally wants information about
himself "veiled," as I should protect the life of my
student.
The institutional imperative of modem medicine
need not obliterate these expectations--and it does not
violate them in the best clinical practice. Knowledge
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and social facts must be shared within the team if care
is to be responsible. But one can share knowledge
without putting the transcript of a conversation into the
record. An age of computerization should enable
added sophistication in record keeping, but it never
will if the idea of confidentiality is dismissed as
"decrepit. "
v
My suggestions so far have not addressed the
question of the President's uro-genital surgery. This is
a difficult kind of issue, raising the question of
whether there are areas of life that should necessarily
be kept secret -- things it is in some sense intrinsically
wrong to talk about.
The reason privacy matters so much is that
actions and selves are defined in terms of the audience
present. Confession of infidelity is one thing in the
bedroom, another in the tabloids. Without zones of
privacy, personal repentance and confession are
impossible. Thus, at a minimum, we can say that any
given culture must respect certain zones of privacy if it
is to preserve social space for acts of contrition and
kindness.9
Can we go beyond this argument to suggest that
some kinds of confidences or secrets should never be
broken, that some kinds of intimacy are intrinsic to the
constitution of the human self in any culture? If so, we
might speak, in a way different from traditional
Catholicism, of a natural duty or realm of
confidentiality .
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The idea of such cross-cultural norms is not
bizarre. For example, many of us unequivocally reject
cannibalism because it violates a kind of innate sanctity
of the human body. We reckon as perverse cultures
who do not share this revulsion. We have a similar
feeling about slavery. In these cases we tend to think
there are some cross-cultural absolutes. Are there also
aspects of the self and its relations that are intrinsically
private; duties to keep confidence that are not
context-dependent but universal?
I want to nominate for discussion three kinds of
secrets that any just person or society will keep. I
describe them in an assertive mode, meaning to
provoke and learn. The first of these possibilities
concerns the confessions or agonies of the soul at time
of death. The end of human life in historic community
is a moment that seems intrinsically private, and it has
been so regarded by most, if not absolutely all,
cultures. Why are reconciliations, disappointments and
feelings at the end essential components of the public
record? Even the last words of a Pope, a CIA director
or a dictator should not be treated as public unless
clearly so intended.
Second, the intimacies shared by lovers and at
birth have always seemed to be peculiarly sacrosanct.
When Delilah betrays Samson, it is not the same thing
as it would be if he were finked on by one of his
colleagues. And this theme is not peculiar to the
religious literature of the West. When a disappointed
lover goes public with facts about the former "love
life," even the greatest boor is insulted--if not injured.
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Finally, we might say that everyone has a kind of
self-image, a kind of extra-territoriality, that it is
intrinsically wrong to disclose--perhaps even to
himself. Ibsen's play The Wild Duck refers to this as a
person's life-~, but the fact that the self-concept that
makes one tick is at best a half-truth is not really the
point. Rather what is central is the fact that there is a
core of selfhood in anyone that it is immoral to make
public. Is there such a thing as being too insightful?
These considerations would stake out a zone of
secrecy around each individual, a zone encompassing
the person's birth and loves, death and most distinctive
interiority. Only publicly produced forms of
autobiography justify biography, and there are areas of
selfhood that the media should leave entirely alone.
This is not to discourage investigative reporting or to
deemphasize the proper role of the press in a
democratic society, only to assert that some things are
intrinsicall y off limits.
Coverage of the President's prostate surgery
probably falls outside this territory. I concede that the
public should know that he has a medical problem, that
it is being treated and that the prognosis is good.
Moreover, his illness may provide an occasion for
teaching the public about prostate examination and
surgery. But somewhere a line is crossed, perhaps
when a facsimile of the presidential penis is presented
in newspapers and on network TV. Insensitivity to
such an assault on dignity suggests a loss of perpective
in the culture.
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VI
I have suggested that the duty to keep
confidences arises from our more-or-Iess intimate
associations with each other. When we are tom
between the duty to keep confidence and to help, we
should veil our speech. And there may be some things
that are intrinsically confidential. The fact that Ihave
suggested, wondered in public, is now an open secret.
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